Category Archives: OAS

Paraguay’s Presidential Change and the Regional Democratic Picture

Reaction to the highly accelerated constitutional removal of Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo appears to be correlated to an individual’s job. Although condemned by Argentine President Cristina Kirchner and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, it is hard not to think that they are grateful for the excuse to suspend Paraguay from the trade bloc Mercosur and get on with business — Venezuela’s accession to the bloc, held up by the Paraguayan congress, was approved last week, and talk (perhaps overly optimistic) of a Mercosur-China trade deal is now active after being off the table because of Paraguay’s diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Over in the Organization of American States, reaction is even more muted, with a very tentative mission of non-South American countries calling the situation ‘calm’ and hoping that the organization will escape more of the sort of attacks seen at the recent Cochabamba general assembly.

While this is a cynical reading, the regional reactions seem to support it. Paraguay had its political rights suspended from Mercosur in symbolic keeping with the bloc’s governing agreements, but this punishment did not extend to economic sanction. Trade continues and, more importantly for Brazil and Argentina, electricity continues to flow from the giant Itaipu and Yacyretá hydroelectric complexes. For his part,  newly installed Paraguayan President Federico Franco has been clear that he does not particularly care about foreign relations and wants to devote his efforts to remedying Lugo’s mistakes. In other words, Franco could care less about participation in Mercosur meetings provided that trade, both legal and illegal, continues.

It is this sort of deeply cynical approach to democracy promotion and protection that has drawn the ire of commentators well versed in the region. The most recent blast comes from Andres Oppenheimer of the Miami Herald, who point blank blames regional leaders such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela for the ‘flexible’ approach to constitutional procedure in Paraguay. He writes: “They have remained silent before so many violations of democratic rights in Nicaragua, Bolivia, Venezuela and Cuba in recent years that they have helped create a climate of “anything goes” in the region.” In broad strokes Oppenheimer is right. A more nuanced approach grounded in the region’s history points to an approach that recognizes that sustainable democratic forms must come from internal negotiations. The problem is that this often results in a somewhat blinkered view of democracy, something which has been remarkably prevalent in Brazilian foreign policy over the last twenty years.

The Brazilian daily O Estado de São Paulo has taken more direct aim at the democratic credentials of Mercosur by asking how the bloc can suspend Paraguay and use that as an opportunity to welcome Venezuela into the club. Like Oppenheimer, the complaint from the Estadão editorial board is that a rather self-serving and pragmatic approach to democracy is being taken within the bloc. What we are discussing here is the difference between the strict legality of democracy and its practical applied reality. Arguments such as that by  Javier El-Hage in Americas Quarterly are very clear that there was nothing specifically illegal or extra-constitutional about Lugo’s impeachment. The problem is the impeachment process failed the very important democratic ‘sniff test’. For Estadão this is a particular problem with respect to Venezuela, a country it has long attacked as descending into authoritarianism through democratic means under Chávez. For like-minded critics the decidedly awkward question is how the dominant leaders of Mercosur — Dilma and Kirchner — will be able to reconcile the bloc’s well-established democratic credentials with the sort of political conduct attributed to Chávez by his detractors.

This sort of complaint lies at the heart of the the argument from Sérgio Malbergier, a columnist for another major Brazilian newspaper, Folha de São Paulo. Malbergier turns the ousting of Lugo into an examination of what sort of leadership role Brazil is going to take in the region and asks whether or not it will do what is necessary to help a country such as Paraguay stay on the democratic path. While not well publicized, there is a very strong history of Brazil intervening quietly, but extremely directly to make sure Paraguay stays on the democratic path. Although Arturo Valenzuela’s account of one of the most serious threats to Paraguayan democracy focuses on the US role, the reality is that Brazil was the central actor during the 1996 coup attempt by General Lino Oviedo against President Juan Carlos Wasmossy. Not only did Wasmossy run to the Brazil’s embassy for succor, he also was quickly flown to Brasília for consultations with the Brazilian president, who directed his military to place strong informal pressure on their Paraguayan counterparts to stand down. Similar pressures have continued over the last fifteen years, varying from closing illicit smuggling routes across the border to pressure contrabanding elites, through to more direct statements of the need to heed the constitutional path and the use of almost vice-regal interventions by Brazilian presidential representatives behind closed doors.
The unstated premise underlying Malbergier’s article is that the scenario in Latin America has changed. A decade ago there were still some questions about democratic permanence in the region. The situation today is different. Maintenance of democratic forms is a prerequisite for any leader seeking to stay in power — just ask Bolivia’s Morales, Ecuador’s Correa and even Venezuela’s Chávez. Thus, while in 2002 it would have been enough to forcefully push for maintenance of democratic forms, the critique from commentators is that a far more muscular approach to supporting operational and applied depth to the forms of democracy is required today. And this is precisely where the response from Argentina and Brazil, the only countries that really matter to Paraguay, falls down. To his credit, Chávez in Venezuela has pushed the point beyond symbolism by creating a real cost to Lugo’s ouster by cutting shipments of subsidized fuel to Paraguay. Kirchner and Dilma have simply excluded Franco from a meeting where he would have had less of a voice than Uruguay, whose protests over the whisking of Venezuela into the bloc were largely ignored.
Lost in this call for direct pressure to maintain substantive democracy in Paraguay is consideration of why this case is any different than a number of other global examples involving the US, EU, Australia and South Africa. Pressure to ‘force’ a country down the democratic path requires massive political will and commitment from the imposing country or region, with the Eastern European example arguably being the only real example of this taking place. The simple reality is that the sort of internal dialogue necessary to support such an interventionist policy has not taken place in Argentina or Brazil. In the Paraguayan case there has been no widespread recognition in neighbouring countries of the impact that democratic consolidation and sustained development in Paraguay would have on the security situation in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. Foreign policy, even on a regional level, has remained an economic question. Unfortunately, recent events in Paraguay are unlikely to change this.
–Sean Burges

Leave a comment

Filed under Analysis, Argentina, Brazil, Democracy, MERCOSUR, OAS, Paraguay

More nails for the inter-American system’s coffin

The recently concluded General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Cochabamba, Bolivia provided a couple more coffin nails for a diverse group of countries patiently working to bury the existing inter-American system. The usual suspects were in the vanguard of the latest assault, with Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua pushing very hard to radically curtail, if not close down completely the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IACHR). At present the idea under discussion is to allow countries to delay the release of country reports for up to a year, radically curtail the independence of the IACHR by putting it more closely under supervision of the General Assembly, and to greatly restrict its ability to comment on the state of press freedom throughout the region.

It is hardly surprising that the chief protagonists of this move are also the ones most staunchly criticized by the IACHR. Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez has repeatedly been criticized for his approach to the political opposition in his country as well as restrictions on press freedom that accompanied acts such as his refusal to renew the broadcast license for RCTV. In Ecuador President Rafael Correa pursued criminal defamation charges against one of the leading daily newspapers, El Universo, and won a massive court settlement before easing back from full imposition of the awarded penalties. The argument from the IACHR’s press freedom reports was not that the presidential grievances were baseless. Privately owned media in Venezuela has relentlessly attacked Chávez and the editorial decisions attacked by Correa were, at best, questionable. Instead, the IACHR and other regional press and human rights observers were raising uncomfortable questions about whether or not some countries in the region were experiencing a dangerous subsidence of the underlying conditions for lasting democratic rule. The charge from the ALBA bloc is that the interventions by the IACHR in the sovereign internal affairs of members states was nothing more than a camouflaged instance of US imperialism backed by Washington’s Canadian cronies.

It is the Brazilian position that is perhaps the most interesting aspect of the ALBA assault on the OAS in Cochabamba. As a tacitly acknowledged counterweight to the US, Brazil has the quiet power to advance or quash initiatives floated in the OAS. Throughout the Cochabamba meetings Brazil remained remarkably quiet, offering little visible defense of the IACHR despite clear statements from president Dilma Rousseff – who was herself tortured during the military dictatorship – that Brazil would advance human rights in its foreign policy. Brazilian silence points to two underlying realities in Brazilian foreign policy.

First, advancement of human rights assumes a minor role in Brazil’s foreign policy agenda. The silence is predicated on a foreign ministry obsession with preventing the creation of precedents that would allow outside intervention in Brazil. The result is an approach that sees foreign policy authorities pointing to the gains that can be made with quiet, behind-closed-doors discussions rather than the sort of public pronouncements and acts that would have a negative impact on relations with countries such as Iran, Sudan and Guinea Bissau. More telling evidence of the place of human rights in Brazil’s foreign policy can be found in the very small size of the foreign ministry unit tasked with managing this international issue.

In practical terms the Brazilian approach to human rights is not terribly different than that found in countries such as the US, France and China. It is an issue that is advanced or ignored to serve other foreign policy priorities. This brings us to the second underlying priority in Brazilian foreign policy, which is to comprehensively emasculate the existing inter-American system and retool it so server Brazilian needs. Brazil has long viewed the OAS as a proxy for US intervention in the region and has consistently worked to mitigate its influence and power. In the 1980s and 1990s this required an oblique approach, which resulted in the successful drive to have one of the country’s top diplomats – João Clemente Baena Soares – named Secretary General of the OAS with an unspoken ambition to quietly hamstring the organization. (Critics might argue that Chile has achieved a similar win with the naming of José Miguel Insulza as OAS head.) Recent Brazilian resistance in the OAS has taken a more direct form, with Canadians being told bluntly in 2001 to butt out of Peru’s electoral process, and the US being told in 2005 that their idea of a democratic enforcement mechanism was a fantastical dream. Interestingly, Chávez social charter was also left cooling its heels in the green room for years.

Brazilian pressure on the inter-American system has only grown as the country’s economy has strengthened. Canada and the US were flatly told they were not welcome, even as observers, at a December 2008 summit of Latin American and Caribbean leaders in Salvador, Brazil. This grouping morphed into a Rio Group / Caribbean cooperation forum before becoming CELAC, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean Nations. With this counterweight in place – a sort of OAS + 1 – 2 because of its inclusion of Cuba and exclusion of Canada and the US – Brazil set out to push harder at denuding the two main pillars of inter-American relations. The most recent Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia may prove to be the last after it was aggressively argued that there was no point holding future meetings without the presence of Cuba. This same issue nearly derailed the OAS at its 2009 General Assembly in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, a meeting that was rescued by agreement on a formula allowing Cuba back into the body.

The attack on the IACHR must have seemed like a welcome and unexpected gift for Brazilian diplomats. Not only did it advance one Brazilian foreign policy priority by further weakening an already feeble institution by denuding one of its effective parts, but it also aligned neatly with Brazil’s own recent outbursts against the IACHR after criticisms were leveled against Brasília’s management of the Belo Monte dam planning process. Brazil’s response was to categorically reject the Belo Monte critique and cut the size of its delegation to the OAS. What was not mentioned was that diplomats posted to the OAS were doing little and that a pretext for their removal was being sought.

Although all neatly wrapped in a Bolivarian flag of regional unity and advancement, the Cochabamba OAS General Assembly appears to have driven a few more nails into the current inter-American system. The question is what will replace it. Even if he does survive his battle with cancer, it is unlikely that Chávez will be able to offer the sort of leadership and coordination necessary to keep hemispheric affairs running smoothly. Decades ago Canada played a role in these issues by quieting ruffled feathers and proposing alternatives, but massive budget cuts to the foreign ministry and a conscious prime ministerial decision to parrot US foreign policy have pushed the Northern country away from the table. Other regional middle-weights such as Chile, Peru, Colombia and Mexico appear to be looking West with the formation of the Pacific Alliance. For its part Brazil is a far from certain leader. Although Brazil seems to like the idea of coordinating and leading the region, the current push to emasculate the OAS seems predicated more on a desire to protect autonomy than advance and manage an attractive alternative project.

It is probably still too early to buy flowers for the OAS’s funeral, but the organization is definitely in ill health. Watch this space for further developments.

–Sean Burges

1 Comment

Filed under Analysis, Global Governance, OAS