O Estado de São Paulo is reporting that the Brazilian and Turkish foreign ministers are talking of relaunching the May 2010 Tehran declaration on nuclear fuel swaps in an effort to prevent an armed attack on Iran. For those who don’t remember, the reaction from the US was, at best, frigid, or to quote one US diplomat talking off the record at the time “Hilary was pissed”. The clever thing that Brazil’s Antonio Patriota and Turkey’s Ahmet Davutoglu have done this time is to pull in another player, namely Sweden’s Carl Bildt.
Reviving the 2010 deal is likely to be received poorly by the nuclear powers trying to pull Iran back from the proliferation brink. That Brazil is pushing such an idea on the margins of this year’s UN General Assembly should not come as a surprise — Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff was explicit in her address that the world has too many weapons of mass destruction and should work to get rid of them all and focus on hunger and poverty instead. While it is hard to argue with her point, we might also ask awkward questions for Brazil about diverting resources away from small arms and warplane manufacturing towards development-facilitating activities, two lucrative export industries for her country.
Dilma is less beholden the hard left of her Workers Party than Lula was — we need only look at how she stared down recent labour action in Brazil — but still needs to throw the odd bone to the Party old guard who have found memories of resisting the empire with their Iranian brothers in the 1970s. What probably matters more in this instance is Brazilian desires to squash anything that might create a precedent for unilateral or multilateral violation of sovereignty, a principle that is utterly sacrosanct for Brazilian foreign policy. After all, another key theme in Dilma’s address to open the UNGA was that the doctrine of “Responsibility to Protect” should be accompanied with a parallel “Responsibility While Protecting”. In practical terms this would likely leave those participating in any internationally sanctioned intervention in a country such as, say Syria, liable for collateral damage. Given the difficulty of getting those with the capability to actually undertake R2P actions to participate, the Brazilian coda, if accepted, would make the potential legal and political costs of such missions even more prohibitively high. And with no R2P being practiced another threat to sovereignty is defused.
All this cynical analysis aside, hopefully the world will get lucky and Sweden will find a way to work with the established team of Brazil and Turkey to rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions and prevent another conflagration in the Middle East.